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THE ROLE OF THE LEGISLATURE, THE

SENTENCING COMMISSION, AND OTHER OFFICIALS
UNDER THE MINNESOTA SENTENCING
GUIDELINES
Richard S. Frase*
INTRODUCTION

Minnesota's experience with sentencing guidelines remains critically
important to legislators and sentencing reformers in other jurisdictions.
Minnesota adopted the first commission-based presumptive sentencing
system in 1980, and its Guidelines 1 have been the focus of exhaustive
study.2 The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission has routinely
collected extensive data on all felony sentences, as well as more detailed
data on selected sentencing samples. 3 This rich source of data and commentary, coupled with a considerable appellate caselaw interpreting the
Guidelines and over a decade of legislative and Commission-initiated
* Benjamin N. Berger Professor of Criminal Law, University of Minnesota. B.A. 1967,
Haverford College; J.D. 1970, University of Chicago Law School.
1. The current version of the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines can be found in MINN.
STAT. ANN. ch. 244, §§ I-V (Appendix) (West 1992) and in MINN. R. CT., MINN. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES AND COMMENTARY §§ I-V (West 1992) [hereinafter GUIDELINES].
2. See, e.g., MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM'N, THE IMPACT OF THE MINNESOTA
SENTENCING GUIDELINES: THREE YEAR EVALUATION (1984) (hereinafter THREE YEAR EVALUATION]; DALE E. PARENT, STRUCTURING CRIMINAL SENTENCES: THE EVOLUTION OF MINNESOTA'S

SENTENCING GUIDELINES (1988); Richard S. Frase, Implementing Commission-based Sentencing Guidelines: The Lessons of the First Ten Years in Minnesota, 2 CORNELL J. LAW &
PUB. POL'Y (forthcoming Spring 1993) (evaluating success of the Guidelines, through 1989,
in achieving the Commission's stated or apparent goals) [hereinafter Frase, First Ten

Years]; Kay A. Knapp, What Sentencing Reform in Minnesota Has and Has Not Accomplished,68 JUDICATURE 181 (1984); Terance D. Miethe, Charging and Plea BargainingPractices under Determinate Sentencing: An Investigation of the Hydraulic Displacement of
Discretion, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 155 (1987); Charles A. Moore & Terance D.
Miethe, Regulated and UnregulatedSentencing Decisions:An Analysis of First-Year Practices Under Minnesota's Felony Sentencing Guidelines, 20 LAW & Soc'y REV. 253 (1986);
Terance D. Miethe & Charles A. Moore, Socioeconomic Disparities under Determinate
Sentencing Systems: A Comparison of Preguidelineand PostguidelinePractices in Minnesota, 23 CRIMINOLOGY 337 (1985); Terance D. Miethe & Charles A. Moore, Can Sentencing
Reform Work? A Four-year Evaluation of Determinate Sentencing in Minnesota (1987)
(project supported by a national Institute of Justice grant, copy on file with author).
Dale Parent's book is reviewed and updated (through 1988) in Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Reform in Minnesota, Ten Years After, 75 MINN. L. REV. 727 (1991) (hereinafter
Frase, Ten Years After]. See also Debra L. Dailey, The Sentencing of Sex Offenders Under
the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines:Is There a Need for Change? 10 HAMLINE J. PUB. L.
& POL'Y 193 (1990); Symposium on Determinate Sentencing, 5 HAMLINE L. REV. 161 (1982)
(articles and casenotes on Minnesota Guidelines).

3. See Frase, First Ten Years, supra note 2, at 52 n.2.
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amendments, provides invaluable lessons concerning the processes by
which commission-based guidelines are drafted, implemented, and evolve
over time.
Although a major goal of the Minnesota Guidelines was to reduce the
legislative role in sentencing, 4 that role has remained prominent in Minnesota and has become increasingly so since 1989. This article examines
the interaction between the Minnesota Legislature and the Minnesota
Sentencing Guidelines Commission, with particular emphasis on the division of decision-making power between the two bodies regarding overall
sentencing purposes and sentencing policy for particular offenses and offenders. This article also describes the role that other criminal justice system actors-particularly the appellate courts-have played in these
decisions, and the powerful influence that political and media events have
had in shaping recent sentencing policy. Part I of the article describes the
1978 legislation creating the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission and discusses the statute's apparent goals and sentencing philosophy. Part II examines the Commission's implementation of its statutory
mandate, and the extent to which the Commission has both followed and
departed from the legislature's original intent. Part III summarizes the
most important legislative, judicial, and Commission-initiated Guidelines
developments to date, while Part IV analyzes the successes and failures of
the Guidelines and anticipates likely developments in the near future.
This article concludes by highlighting the lessons of the Minnesota experience, lessons that should serve as guides to legislators in other jurisdictions in drafting an enabling statute and in defining the legislature's
proper post-implementation role.
I.

THE

1978

ENABLING STATUTE AND ITS APPARENT PURPOSES

The broad outlines of the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines were laid
down in a 1978 statute creating the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines
Commission5 (Commission). The new Commission was to be composed of
nine members-a justice of the Minnesota Supreme Court, two district
court judges, one public defender, one county attorney, the Commissioner
of Corrections, the Corrections (parole) Board Chairman, and two public
members.
The Commission was directed to promulgate guidelines regulating
both the decision to impose state imprisonment and the duration7 of that
imprisonment. These guidelines were to be based on "reasonable offense
and offender characteristics" and were to take into "substantial consider4. For a discussion of this goal, see infra text accompanying note 140-43.
5. 1978 Minn. Laws 723.
6. Id. art. I, § 9. The Commission now has 11 members, including three public members: a peace officer, a probation or parole officer (in lieu of the former Corrections Board
representative), and a court of appeals judge (in lieu of one of the district court judges).
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 244.09-2 (West 1992).
7. Presumptive prison durations were to fall within a narrow range (plus or minus
15% of the presumptive duration). 1978 Minn. Laws 723, § 9-5.
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ation" (1) current sentencing and release practices, and (2) correctional
resources-including but not limited to the capacities of local and state
correctional facilities." The Commission was also permitted, though not
required, to develop guidelines regulating the conditions of non-prison
sentences." Parole release was abolished under the act and was replaced
with a specified reduction-up to one-third off the pronounced sentence-for good behavior in prison. 10 This earned "good time" reduction
would then constitute a period of parole-like post-release supervision, the
"supervised release term."" The statute also implied that denial of good
time reductions could only be based on disciplinary violations, and not on
a failure to participate in or cooperate with in-prison treatment programs,
since all such programs were to become voluntary." Finally, sentencing
judges were directed under the act to provide written reasons for departing from the new guidelines," with both the prosecution and defense
given the right to appeal any sentence, whether or not it constituted a
departure.14
The procedures and policy decisions adopted by the Commission to
carry out its statutory mandate are discussed later in this article; however, it is worthwhile to pause at this juncture to inquire what conclusions
can be reached concerning the original legislative intent reflected in the
enabling statute and its legislative history. It seems clear that a major
purpose of the enabling statute was to reduce sentencing discretion, thus
promoting greater uniformity of sentences. What broader sentencing purposes did the legislature intend? Subsequent Commission reports indicate
that retribution, or "just deserts," represented the primary sentencing
goal under the Guidelines.' 5 Did the legislature desire such a focus?' 6 If
not clearly retributive, can the enabling statute at least be read as rejecting each of the utilitarian purposes of punishment-rehabilitation, incapacitation, and deterrence? As discussed more fully in Part III of this
article, subsequent legislation, appellate caselaw, and trial court departure practices strongly indicate continued adherence to utilitarian sentencing goals.' 7 Which theory of punishment is truer to the legislature's
original intent? How much of a departure from existing sentencing norms
8. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 244.09-5(2) (West 1992).
9. Id.
10. Id. § 244.04.
11. Id. § 244.05.
12. Id. § 244.02, 244.03.
13. Id. § 244.10-2.
14. Id. § 244.11.
15. THREE YEAR EVALUATION, supra note 2, at 10.
16. The legislative goal of uniformity does not necessarily imply an emphasis on just
deserts. Reduced discretion limits the ability of courts to achieve all major punishment
goals-not only individualized treatment and incapacitation, but also retributive proportionality (i.e., "making the punishment fit the crime"). See Richard S. Frase, Defendant
Amenability to Treatment or Probation as a Basis for Departure Under the Minnesota
and Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 3 FED. SENT. REP'. 328, 332 (1991).
17. For an explanation of the utilitarian goals of sentencing, see infra notes 36-43 and
accompanying text.
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did the legislature anticipate?
The principal academic proponent of the theory of just deserts, Professor Andrew von Hirsch, has conceded that the Minnesota enabling
statute "suggests no particular rationale" or choice between sentencing
purposes.18 Indeed, the statute directs the Commission to give "substantial consideration" to existing sentencing and release practices. This instruction suggests that the legislature desired both limited change in preexisting norms and substantial continued emphasis on utilitarian goals.
Of course, the statute did limit the pursuit of such goals (especially rehabilitation and incapacitation) in that discretionary parole release was
abolished and all prison treatment programs were made voluntary. However, the statute did not forbid consideration of the offender's treatment
needs or dangerousness when determining whether to impose a prison
term; nor did it preclude the imposition of conditions of probation or supervised release designed to promote rehabilitation or public safety.
Thus, although individualized parole-risk assessments and coerced "cure"
in prison were both abandoned, probation-risk assessments and treatment in the community-even mandated treatmentl'9-were not necessarily rejected.
Nor does the legislative history of the enabling statute evince an intention to abandon utilitarian goals in favor of an emphasis on retribution, or to dramatically change any existing sentencing norms. The 1978
enabling act represented the culmination of several years of legislative
ferment over the sentencing reform issue, reflecting increased dissatisfaction with indeterminate sentencing, but general indecision over the
proper reform course to follow.2 0 Sentencing purposes were apparently

rarely debated as such. What consensus did exist seemed to focus on
abolishing the parole board and enhancing the uniformity of sentences
without any overall increase in sentencing severity or prison populations
and, it seems, without agreement to change the sentencing of any particular offenses or offenders.2 1 It is also worth noting that the 1978 legislature
did not delete the references to utilitarian goals contained in the state's
criminal code.22 Moreover, the same bill that created the Commission also
amended the statute governing presentence investigations to make these
18.

ANDREW VON HIRSCH ET AL., THE SENTENCING COMMISSION AND ITS GUIDELINES

(1987).
19. Cf. Lynne Goodstein, Sentencing Reform and the CorrectionalSystem, 5

LAW

65

&

POL'Y Q. 478, 494 (1983) (noting early emergence of the practice of setting mandatory treat-

ment conditions of supervised release-the Guidelines "parole" term).
20. See generally CLARK, AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF SENTENCING

REFORM LEGISLA-

1975-1978 (1979) (unpublished report to the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission) (on file with author); PARENT, supra note 2, at 21-27; Susan E. Martin, Interests

TION:

and Politics in Sentencing Reform: The Development of Sentencing Guidelines in Minne-

sota and Pennsylvania, 29 VILL. L. REV. 21 (1984).
21. VON HIRSCH ET AL., supra note 18, at 111.
22. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.01-1 (West 1992) (purposes of Code include deterrence,
rehabilitation, incapacitation, fair notice, sentences reasonably related to conduct and character of accused, and fair procedures).
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measures mandatory in felony cases, but did not delete or amend references to rehabilitation contained in the same subdivision of that statute.2 3
What, then, were the most probable legislative purposes in enacting
the 1978 enabling statute? As the above analysis suggests, the major goals
of this reform were: (1) to limit sharply judicial and parole discretion in
pursuing all of the traditional purposes of punishment, without abandoning any of those purposes or preferring some over others; (2) to emphasize that a state prison sentence is imposed primarily to achieve
retribution, deterrence, and incapacitation, and is not imposed to achieve
forced rehabilitation (rehabilitation is to be pursued, if at all, outside of
prison); (3) to consider other changes in sentencing policy, without departing significantly from existing practices; and (4) to recognize while
pursuing the above goals that punishment-especially incarceration-is
expensive and that overcrowding of facilities and other resources must be
avoided, even if this means a failure to fully achieve all other punishment
goals.
II.

THE ORIGINAL 1980 GUIDELINES-COMMISSION IMPLEMENTATION OF,
AND COMPLIANCE WITH, THE LEGISLATIVE MANDATE

How did the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission interpret
and carry out its legislative mandate to develop and implement sentencing guidelines? As described in the previous section, the Commission's
principal statutory directives were: (1) to promulgate guidelines governing
which offenders should be sent to prison, and for how long, based on
"reasonable offense and offender characteristics;" (2) to consider guidelines for non-prison sentences, although the Commission was not required
to develop such guidelines; and (3) in drafting the guidelines, to take into
"substantial consideration" current sentencing and release practices and
24
the state's correctional resources.

23.
24.

Id. § 609.115-1.
Id. § 244.09-5 (2).
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Figure 1
Original Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Grid
Effective May 1, 1980
Presumptive Sentence Lengths in Months
Italicized numbers within the grid denote the range within which a
judge may sentence without the sentence being deemed a departure.
CRIMINAL HISTORY SCORE
SEVERITY LEVELS OF
Unauthorized Use of
Motor Vehicle
Possession of Marijuana

6 or more

I

12'

12"

12"

15

18

21

24

II

121

12*

14

17

20

23

27
2-29

III

12*

13

16

19

22
22
21-23

27
22
25-29

32
3
30-34

Burglary - Felony Intent
Receiving Stolen Goods
IV
(810-250)24-26
(S150-$2500)

12"

15

18

21

Simple Robbery

V

18

23

27

Assault, 2nd Degree

VI

Theft Related Crimes
($150-42500)
Sale of Marijuana
Theft Crimes ($150-2500)

Assault, lst Degree
Criminal
l DeSexual Conduct,
1stDegre

VIII

25

30

32

41

30-34

37-45

30

38

46

54

29-31

36-40

43-49

50-58

34
33-35

44
42-46

54

65

50-58

60-70

21

26

24
23-25

32
30-34

41
38-44

49
45-53

65
60-70

81
75-87

97
90-104

54
50-58

65
6
60-70

76
76
71-81

95
9
89-101

113
13
106-120

132
12
124-140

43
41-45

-54

Murder, 3rd Degree

Ix

97
94-100

119
116-122

127
124-130

149
143-155

176
168-184

205
195-215

230
218-242

Murder, 2nd Degree

X

116
111-121

140
133-147

162
153-171

203
192-214

243
231-255

284
270-298

324
309-339

Under state statutes, Ist Degree Murder has a mandatory life sentence.
* one year and one day

Pursuant to this statutory mandate, the Commission promulgated a
set of guidelines represented by the matrix shown in Figure 1, with ten
categories of offense severity on the vertical axis and seven defendant
criminal history scores on the horizontal axis.2 5 Offenders with low to medium criminal history scores convicted of lower severity offenses were to
receive a "stayed" (suspended) prison term of a specified number of
months. For more serious offenses or criminal history scores, the presumptive sentence was an "executed" prison term within a narrow speci25. MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES Comm.,
[hereinafter 1980 COMMISSION REPORT].

REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE

30 (1980)
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fled range (e.g., thirty to thirty-four months).2 These durations were
based primarily on prior parole release practices (plus good time) and system impact (i.e., staying within prison capacity). The boundary between
presumptive stayed and presumptive executed prison terms was shown on
the matrix by a heavy black line known as the "disposition line." Cases
above the line had presumptive stayed sentences, except for a few cases
involving dangerous weapons or repeat sex offenders, which were subject
to mandatory minimum prison terms under existing state statutes. Additional rules specified when consecutive prison sentences could be imposed, listed permissible and impermissible bases for departing from
presumptive disposition and durational rules, defined a departure standard (i.e., "substantial and compelling circumstances"), 27 and suggested,
but did not require, a wide variety of possible conditions of stayed prison
sentences-up to one year of confinement in a local jail or workhouse,
supervised or unsupervised probation, fines, restitution, treatment, and
community service.2
One of the earliest decisions the Commission made was to adopt a
"prescriptive" rather than a "descriptive" approach to guidelines development.2 9 That is, the new Guidelines were not expected to simply model
and perpetuate past judicial and parole decisions, or even the average of
prior decisions. Although prior practices were taken into account, the
Commission independently determined which offenders should go to
prison, for how long, and what the primary purpose of punishment ought
to be. Thus, the new Guidelines were intended to be "norm-changing,"
not simply "norm-reinforcing." On the other hand, the Commission
strictly interpreted its statutory mandate to consider existing correctional
resources and adopted a goal of never exceeding 95% of prison capacity.
The Commission then developed a computerized projection model to predict the future prison populations which would result from proposed
guidelines and tailored the latter to stay within expected capacity. Finally, the Commission chose not to develop guidelines for non-prison
sentences, although it did make "non-presumptive recommendations" for
those sentences.
In addition to its emphasis on just deserts, the Commission's most
important "prescriptive" changes to pre-existing sentencing policy included the following:
- The Commission developed a rank-ordering of offense severity based
26. The Commission's cell ranges generally varied from 5% to 8% above or below the
cell midpoint, which was less than the 15% allowed by the enabling act. See VON HIRSCH ET
AL., supra note 18., at 65.
27. This standard is arguably stricter than that provided in the enabling statute: "unreasonable, inappropriate, excessive [or] unjustifiably disparate." See id. at 73.
28. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.135 (West 1992). In felony cases, the duration of a stayed
sentence, and thus, the length of probation, may be any period up to the maximum prison
term that could have been imposed, or three years, whichever is longer. Id. § 609.135-2(a).
29. See 1980 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 25, at 2-3; THREE YEAR EVALUATION,
supra note 2, at v, 8-10.
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entirely on its own determination of the "seriousness" of each crime.30
The Commission did not explain how these rankings differed from
those implicit in prior imprisonment and parole release decisions, but a
comparison of Commission rankings with the average pre-Guidelines
prison rates and duratioris for each offense reveals substantial
differences."
- The Commission's criminal history scale included one point for prior
misdemeanor convictions and another point for prior juvenile felonylevel adjudications; the former had not been a significant factor in the
pre-Guidelines decisions and the latter had been considered
32
inconsistently.
- The Commission excluded consideration of the defendant's education,
marital status, and employment status at the time of the offense or at
sentencing, even though this last factor had been significant in prior
dispositional decisions. 3 The Commission concluded that such "social
status" variables should not bear on the sentencing decision since they
tended to be correlated with race and income level. In this respect, the
Commission adopted the broad prescriptive norm that "sentencing
should be neutral with respect to race, gender, social, or economic
3
status."
* In deciding where to draw the disposition line separating presumptive
stayed from presumptive executed prison terms, the Commission emphasized a flatter, more "desert-oriented" slope and specifically chose
to send more low-criminal history "person
offenders," and fewer recidi35
vist "property offenders" to prison.
Despite its avowed emphasis on retribution, even the Commission
did not abandon utilitarian sentencing goals. Nor did the Commission expect that most offenders would actually receive their full just deserts. The
Guidelines were written in such a way that at least three-quarters of defendants would receive presumptive non-prison or stayed sentences.3
The "deserved" sentence in these cases was defined only in terms of the
presumptive duration provided for cases where an aggravated dispositional departure was ordered or the initial stay of prison was later revoked. Moreover, the Guidelines recommended and assumed that such

30. 1980 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 25, at 6-7.
31. For example, child sex abuse cases received a severity rank of 94 out of 100, and
were placed in Severity Level VIII (presumptive executed prison sentence, even for a first
offense); but in 1978, only 45 percent of these cases received executed terms. Minn. Sentencing Guidelines Comm'n, 1978 Dispositional sample (analyzed by the author, using SPSS
PC+ software; the data is described in the THREE YEAR EVALUATION, supra note 2, at 1920).
32. 1980 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 25, at 7.
33. Id. at 5.
34. GUIDELINES, supra note 1, § I(1).
35. 1980 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 25, at 9, 15; THREE YEAR EVALUATION, supra
note 2, at 21.
36. Presumptive stays would have applied to 83% of the cases in the pre-guidelines
baseline dataset (1978), and in the first year after the Guidelines became effective, 85% of
defendants had presumptive stayed sentences. This percentage has fallen in more recent
years, and was only 75% in 1989. Frase, First Ten Years, supra note 2, at 16-17.
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departures and revocations would be rare. In the absence of departure or
revocation, the Guidelines did not specify any particular sentence for
these defendants. Under pre-Guidelines sentencing laws, such defendants
could receive up to twelve months in jail-or no jail at all; they could be
required to undergo residential or outpatient treatment, comply with
strict supervised probation, pay restitution, fines, costs, and perform community work obligations-or be subjected to none of these penalties. Of
the pre-Guidelines defendants studied by the Commission, less than half
received any jail time. Thus, the Commission must have expected a large
number of defendants to receive less than their full just deserts, as measured by their presumptive stayed prison duration. For these defendants,
the retributive standards established an upper limit of severity, but did
not further define the sentence.
In terms of the sentencing philosophy to be applied to cases with
presumptive stayed prison terms, all of the traditional purposes of punishment were retained. The Guidelines provided the following advice on
the setting of stay conditions:
[The proper] penal objectives to be considered in establishing conditions of stayed sentences [include] retribution, rehabilitation, public
protection, restitution, deterrence, and public condemnation of criminal
conduct; the relative importance of these objectives may vary with both
offense and offender characteristics and ... multiple objectives may be
present in any given sentence."'
This statement, of course, embodies the classic values of indeterminate
sentencing theory and reflects a clear endorsement, in the context of nonprison sentences, of the full range of utilitarian goals of punishment.
Thus, for most defendants, the original 1980 Guidelines essentially retained the traditional indeterminate sentencing system and its utilitarian
values, subject only to retributive "caps" set by the presumptive duration
of stayed prison terms.
As for the minority of defendants with presumptive executed prison
terms, the Commission must have expected that many defendants would
not receive their full just deserts and that utilitarian sentencing purposes
would continue to play an important role. The Guidelines imposed concessions which can easily be used to avoid or mitigate presumptive prison
terms. The Commission must have also known that prosecutors could,
and probably would, at times consider offender-based, utilitarian sentencing goals in deciding to grant or deny such concessions. 8
Thus, it is an over-simplification to say that the original 1980 Minnesota Guidelines reflected a purely retributive/just deserts philosophy, or
even a "modified" 39 or "primarily"4 just deserts philosophy. The Guide37. GUIDELINES, supra note 1, § III(A)(2).
38. For a brief discussion of caselaw authorizing courts to depart dispositionally based
on findings of offender "amenability" to probation, see infra text at notes 67-73.
39. 1980 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 25, at 9.
40. THREE YEAR EVALUATION, supra note 2, at v, 10-14.
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lines, as written, were actually more consistent with the "limiting" retributivism suggested in the writings of Professor Norval Morris. 41 For
most defendants, considerations of just deserts set only upper limits on
sentencing severity. Within those limits, courts and prosecutors were expected to continue to pursue utilitarian purposes of punishment-especially rehabilitation-and were to be guided by a general
principle of restraint and economy that Morris labels "parsimony. '4 2 As
the original Guidelines provided, sanctions were to be "the least restrictive necessary to achieve the purposes of the sentence."4 3 However, consistent with Morris' view,"4 no offender was to be sent to prison for either
coerced treatment or on the basis of individualized predictions of dangerousness. Nor was the duration of imprisonment to be based on "need-fortreatment" or dangerousness assessments. Instead, a state prison sentence under the Guidelines was intended to further retribution, general
deterrence, and incapacitation, and its duration was measured primarily
by retributive standards.

Ill. MAJOR

LEGISLATIVE, JUDICIAL, AND COMMISSION-INITIATED CHANGES

SINCE 1980
The Guidelines and related sentencing laws have been amended
many times since 1980, particularly with respect to presumptive prison
durations for high-severity offenses (compare the current grid, shown in
Figure 2 below, with the original grid shown in Figure 1). The following
discussion explains how these and other important changes resulted from
legislative, judicial, and Commission-initiated decisions, as well as important political and media events. The judicial contributions are largely independent and are described separately; however, the legislative and
Commission decisions are so closely intertwined that a single chronological report, covering each major phase of Guidelines evolution, best describes these developments.

41. NORVAL MORRIS, MADNESS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 199 (1982) (duration only sets
maximum and minimum of sentence; any further "fine tuning" to be done on utilitarian
grounds); NORVAL MORRIS, THE FUTbRE OF IMPRISONMENT 60, 73-76 (1974).
42.

NORVAL MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 59 (1974).

43. GUIDELINES, supra note 1, § 1(3).
44. MORRIS, supra note 42, at 17-20, 59-73.
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Figure 2

Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Grid
Effective August 1, 1989
Presumptive Sentence Lengths in Months
Italicized numbers within the grid denote the range within which a
judge may sentence without the sentence being deemed a departure.
CRIMINAL HISTORY SCORE

SEVERITY LEVELS OF
CONVICTION OFFENSE

6 or more

Sale of a Simulated
Controlled Substance
Theft Related Crimes
($2500 or less)

19
18-20

II

12"

12"

13

15

17

19

2
20-22

Theft Crimes
($2500 or less)

111

12"

13

15

17

19
18-20

22
21-23

25
24-26

NonresidentialBurglary
Theft Criimes (over $2500)

IV

12"

15

18

21

25
24-26

32
30-34

41
37-45

V

is

23

27

30
29-31

38
36-40

46
43-49

54
50-58

21

26

30

Check Forgery (,200-$2500)

Residential Burglary
Simple Robbery
Criminal Sexual Conduct

2nd Degree (a) & (b)

Criminal Sexual Conduct,

1st Deee
Aslst Degree

Assault, 1st Degree

VIuI
VI

Murder, 3rd Degree

Murder, 2nd Degree
ourder
)
(elony murder)

Murder, 2nd Degree

(with intent)

X

34

44

54

65

33-35

42-46

50-58

60-70

48
44-52

58
54-62

68
64-72

78
74-82

88
84-92

98
108
_4-102 104-112

86
81-91

98
93-103

110
105-115

122
117-127

134
129-139

146
141-151

158
153-163

150
144-156

165
159-171

180
174-186

195
189-201

210
204-216

225
219-231

240
234-246

306

326

346

366

386

406

426

299-313

319-333

339-353

359-373

379-393

399-413

419-433

Under state statutes, Ist Degree Murder has a mandatory life sentence.
* one year and one day

A.

Legislative Approval of Commission Proposals

A key issue in any commission-based sentencing system involves the
division of labor between the legislature and the commission in enacting
specific guidelines. While the 1978 enabling act allowed the Minnesota
Legislature to veto the initial set of Guidelines proposed by the Commission, it did not define the legislature's role in the proposal or approval of
subsequent changes.45 In 1982, the Commission and the legislature agreed
45.

MINN. STAT. ANN. § 244.09-5 (West 1992).
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on a procedure whereby the legislature could require the Commission either to adopt certain legislative amendments to the Guidelines or to report its rationale for failing to do so. 46 A 1984 statute47 imposed

additional legislative control. This statute provided that all Commissioninitiated changes to the Guidelines grid or any other modifications resulting in reduced sentences or the early release of any inmate be submitted
to the legislature by January I of any given year, to become effective on
August 1 of that year, unless the legislature specifically provided
otherwise.
B. Major Guidelines and Statutory Changes Through 1988
The most important changes made by the Commission itself between
1980 and 1988 involved the duration of presumptive prison terms.4 8 In
1983, the Commission lowered sentence durations at severity levels I
through III, with medium to high criminal history, by amounts ranging
from one to seven months to avoid prison overcrowding. 4 At the same
time, the Commission added from eight to one hundred months to the
presumptive durations in certain cells at severity levels IX and X.1
Apart from these Commission-initiated changes, the legislature
adopted major statutory changes affecting the Guidelines between 1980
and 1988. In 1981, the legislature amended the statute requiring a
mandatory minimum prison term for the use of a dangerous weapon during the commission of a crime. This amendment increased the prison
term for the use of a firearm during commission of a crime, increased the
number of offenses to which the statute applied, and authorized courts to
depart from the mandatory minimum prison term on the prosecutor's
motion. 5 1 In that same year, the legislature created the separate offense of
Intrafamilial Sexual Abuse to parallel the existing Criminal Sexual Conduct statutes. This legislation provided that the court could impose a
stayed prison sentence if it found a stay to be in the best interest of the
complainant or .the family unit.52 In 1985, the requirements for such
46. PARENT, supra note 2, at 50.
47. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 244.09-11 (West 1992).
48. In addition, the disposition line was changed so that the upper righthand cell (severity level I, criminal history six or more) is now a presumptive executed prison sentence,
not a stayed sentence (compare figures 1 and 2); also, aggravating factors were added for
drug crimes, violent crimes for hire, and gang-related offenses. See KAY A. KNAPP, MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND COMMENTARY ANNOTATED 61A (1985 & Supp. 1992).
49. THREE YEAR EVALUATION, supra note 2, at 92.
50. Id.
51. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.11-4, -9 (West 1987). The statutory "sentence apart" provision may have been added in response to a Minnesota Supreme Court decision holding that
the weapons statute was truly mandatory and did not permit probation (stay of imprisonment). State v. Jonason, 292 N.W.2d 730 (Minn. 1980). In 1982, the Minnesota Supreme
Court ruled that the trial court may also depart on its own initiative without a prosecutor's
motion. State v. Olson, 325 N.W.2d 13 (Minn. 1982).
52. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.364 to .3644 (West 1985). This provision was repealed in
1985 and replaced by similarly-worded provisions in the regular Criminal Sexual Conduct
statutes. See, e.g., id. § 609.342-1(g), -3 (West 1987 & Supp. 1993) (stay authorized for cer-
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stayed sentences were supplemented. A "professional assessment" provision was added requiring a finding that the offender had been accepted
by, and could respond to, a treatment program5 3 before the court could
impose a stayed prison term. In addition, the court was required to compel the defendant to complete the treatment program and serve some period of incarceration in a local jail or warehouse.5 4 In 1987, the legislature
added a similar "amenable-to-treatment" provision to the statute imposing a mandatory minimum prison term for repeat sex offenders. 5 In 1985,
1986, and 1987, the legislature and the Commission adopted substantially
increased penalties for cocaine and certain other drug crimes."
C. Important Early Guidelines Caselaw
Most of the major judicial decisions interpreting the Guidelines occurred in the first two years following their implementation. The Minnesota Supreme Court entirely controlled the early interpretation of the
57
Guidelines, since the intermediate court of appeals did not yet exist.
The supreme court promptly established the principle that sentencing be
based on the "conviction offense" rather than on details of offenses either
dismissed or never filed-so-called "real offense" sentencing.5 ' The court
also determined that judges could not base departures from the Guidelines on assessments of the individual defendant's dangerousness,59 on
special needs for deterrence,6 0 or on factors such as the absence of criminal history, which the drafters of the Guidelines had already taken into
account."' In State v. Evans,6'2 the court ruled that upward durational
tain offenders with a "significant relationship" to the complainant).
53. Id. § 609.11-4, -9.
54. Id. § 609.342-3(1), (2). The statute has been further amended such that the defendant can "have no unsupervised contact with the complainant" prior to completion of
the program. Id. § 609.342-3.
55. Id. § 609.346-2. See also State v. Feinstein, 338 N.W.2d 244 (Minn. 1983) (holding
that trial courts still have authority to grant probation in cases covered by this mandatory
minimum statute, provided they comply with Guidelines requirements for a mitigated dispositional departure).
56.

MINN. SENTENCING

GUIDELINES

TROLLED SUBSTANCE OFFENSES

CoMA'N, REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE

ON CON-

3-4 (1992).

57. The Minnesota Court of Appeals did not begin issuing opinions until February
1984.
58. THREE YEAR EVALUATION, supra note 2, at 111-13. Cf. United States v. Galloway,
976 F.2d 414 (8th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (upholding trial court's power to impose a sentence
three times longer than the Federal Sentencing Guidelines' presumptive term based on uncharged "relevant conduct"). However, some real-offense sentencing is permitted under the
Minnesota Guidelines (e.g., mandatory prison terms are applicable if the offense is committed with a weapon, including many crimes which do not include weapon use as an element).
See Frase, First Ten Years, supra note 2, at 57 n.24.
59. State v. Hagen, 317 N.W.2d 701, 703 (Minn. 1982).
60. State v. Schmit, 329 N.W.2d 56, 58 n.1 (Minn. 1983).
61. THREE YEAR EVALUATION, supra note 2, at 121, 124 (concept of "redundancy" with
other Guidelines provisions or with factors inherent in the nature of the offense).
62. 311 N.W.2d 481 (Minn. 1981).
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departures should not generally exceed twice the presumptive duration.0 3
However, the court intimated that in exceptional cases, the trial court
could depart up to the statutory maximum. 4 Trial court decisions that
did not depart from the Guidelines were largely insulated from appellate
scrutiny by the court's statement in State v. Kindem, 5 that "[although]
we do not intend entirely to close the door . . . it would be a rare case
which would warrant reversal of the refusal to depart." '
In another significant line of cases, the Minnesota Supreme Court
held that dispositional departures, but not durational departures, could
be based on individualized assessments of the offender's "amenability" to
probation or prison. 7 In State v. Park,68 the court upheld an upward dispositional departure, consisting of commitment to prison rather than the
presumptive stayed term, based on the defendant's "unamenability" to
probation as evidenced by prior probation violations and an unwillingness
to admit a chemical dependency problem.6 1 In State v. Wright,70 the
court upheld a downward dispositional departure based on findings that
the defendant was unusually vulnerable and was, therefore, unamenable
to prison.7 1 In State v. Trog,72 the court upheld a downward dispositional
departure based solely on the defendant's particular amenability to probation. In reaching this decision, the court emphasized the aberrational
and uncharacteristic nature of the defendant's crime, rather than any
73
specific treatment needs.
In State v. Randolph,74 the court held that the trial court must grant
a defendant's request for execution of the presumptive stayed prison term
when the trial court's proposed conditions of the stay are so onerous that
they are, in effect, more severe than the prison term. 75 Such defendant
requests account for a high proportion of upward dispositional
76
departures.
Finally, in State v. Hernandez,77 the court held that criminal history
63. Id. at 483.
64.

Id.

65.

313 N.W.2d 6 (Minn. 1981).

66. Id. at 7.
67. These cases are discussed at length in Frase, Ten Years After, supra note 2, at
740-48. A similar line of cases decided under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines is discussed
in Frase, supra note 16, at 328.
68. 305 N.W.2d 775 (Minn. 1981).
69. Id.
70. 310 N.W.2d 461 (Minn. 1981).
71. Id. at 462.
72. 323 N.W.2d 28 (Minn. 1982).
73. Id. at 31. Commission data on trial court reasons for departure indicates that amenable-to-probation findings are quite common, constituting one-half of all downward dispositional departures. See Frase, First Ten Years, supra note 2, at 41.
74. 316 N.W.2d 508 (Minn. 1982).
75. Id. at 510-11.
76. See Frase, Ten Years After, supra note 2, at 738; Frase, First Ten Years, supra
note 2, at 29. Randolph requests, coupled with cases of defendants already in or going to
prison on other charges, accounted for three-quarters of upward dispositional departures.
77. 311 N.W.2d 478 (Minn. 1981).
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points may accrue on a single day when defendants are sentenced concurrently for more than one offense. 78 For example, a defendant with no previous convictions who is sentenced concurrently on four separate
residential burglary counts would have a criminal history of three, moving
him across the disposition line, by ihe time he is sentenced on the fourth
count. Prior to Hernandez, prosecutors could threaten to serialize prosecutions to achieve the same result; additional concurrent counts would
also increase the defendant's future criminal history if he committed further offenses. The effect of Hernandez is to accelerate the impact and
plea-bargaining leverage of multiple counts. The Hernandez rule also
helps prosecutors target and incapacitate "high-rate" offenders. Although
such utilitarian purposes seem at odds with the Commission's just deserts
philosophy, incapacitation goals (or at least, effects) were implicit in the
Guidelines from the outset. Offenders with higher criminal history scores
receive much more severe presumptive sentences. 79 Moreover, "prior"
convictions have always been counted as of the date of sentencing; 0
under a purely retributive theory, events occurring after the date of the
current offense have no bearing on the "deserved" punishment for that
offense."1
D. Major Guidelines and Statutory Changes in 1989
In 1988, public pressure for substantially increased penalties and legislative demand for closer control over sentencing began to escalate rapidly. The Commission had faced similar political crises in the past,82 but
the "crime wave of '88" proved too broad and too sustained to resist.
Pressure began to build in the late spring of 1988 with a series of rapemurders in Minneapolis parking ramps. The Minnesota Attorney General
appointed a task force on sexual violence against women which issued
strong demands to the legislature and the Commission to substantially
increase rape sentences. 3 At the same time, the city of Minneapolis was
experiencing a general increase in violent and drug crimes-the 1988
murder rate was 50 percent higher than in 1987, while drug offenses had
grown by 60 percent. 4
In mid-November of 1988, the Commission responded by proposing
an increase in prison durations for violent crimes (and a corresponding
reduction in prison terms for property offenders, in order to stay within
prison capacity). Under the proposal, for example, the presumptive sentence before reduction for good time for a first-degree rapist with no
78. Id. at 481.
79. See infra Figure 2.
80. GUIDELINES, supra note 1, § II(B)-(C).
81. See PARENT, supra note 2, at 163.
82. Id. at 140-46.
83. MINN. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE ON THE PREVENTION OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN, FINAL REPORT 1 (1989).
84. MINNEAPOLIS POLICE DEPARTMENT, CRIME ANALYSIS UNIT, UNIFORM CRIME REPORT
SUMMARY 2 (1988).
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criminal history would have increased from 3.5 to 4.5 years. These proposals, however, were met by calls to double sentences for violent offenders. 5 In December of 1988, the Commission complied with public
demand, approving increases in all sentence durations at severity levels
VII and VIII. Durations were doubled for defendants with no criminal
history and were increased substantially, but by lesser percentages, for
defendants with higher criminal histories. The Commission also adopted
a criminal history weighting scheme, valuing prior felony convictions at a
range of one-half point for severity levels I and II to two points for severity levels VIII, IX, and X. The Commission designed this weighting
scheme in part to counter the substantial increase in the number of property offenders with high criminal histories and presumptive-commit
sentences."' These and other changes became effective on August 1,
1989.87

Even with these proposals, however, the pressure for increased sentence severity and legislative control did not ease. In the spring of 1989,
the legislature considered a number of "get tough" crime bills. Two of
these bills would have re-established the death penalty which had not
been operative in Minnesota since 1911.88 The 1989 Omnibus Crime Bill
finally adopted included a number of severe measures-life without parole for certain first-degree murderers, mandatory maximum terms for
other recidivist murderers and sex offenders, minimum prison terms for
certain drug crimes, and increased statutory maximums for other violent
and sex crimes.88
The 1989 Omnibus Crime Bill also included a provision permitting a
non-prison sentence for drug offenders when a professional assessment
indicates that the offender has been accepted by and can respond to a
treatment program. 0 In addition, the legislation imposed extended terms
and mandatory minimum prison terms for offenders committing certain
sex-motivated crimes if the court finds, based on a professional assessment, that the defendant is "a patterned sex offender" in need of longterm treatment or supervision, or is "a danger to public safety."9 1 This
latter finding is required to be based on either the presence of one or
more aggravating factors in the offense or on the commission of a previ85. MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., Nov. 18, 1988, at 7A.
86. See Frase, First Ten Years, supra note 2, at 38 (these histories and sentences
resulted, in part, from sentencing under Hernandez).
87. See KNAPP, supra note 48, at 13A, 28A, 32A, 51A, 53A, and 107A. The Commission
also amended the Guidelines Commentary to provide that no amenability departure is valid
unless the court "demonstrate[s] that the departure is not based on any of the excluded
[social or economic] factors." The Commission expressly declined, however, to either prohibit all such departures or propose criteria for their use. MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
COMM'N, REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE 17-18 (1989).

88. 1989 Minn. S. File No. 768; 1989 Minn. H. File No. 998.
89. 1989 Minn. Laws 290, art. 2, §§ 10, 12, 14; art. 3, §§ 13, 28; art. 4, §§ 12-15; art. 6,
§ 5-11 (these severe measures may well have been the "price" of defeating the death pen-

alty bills).
90. Id. art. 3, § 20.
91. Id. art. 4, § 10.
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ous violent crime. Early release is allowed if the offender proves amenable
to treatment and has made sufficient progress in a prison sex offender
treatment program to be released to a community program.
The 1989 Omnibus Crime Bill contained further provisions authorizing judges to make individualized assessments of dangerousness in setting
prison sentences. 2 Judges are authorized to impose the statutory maximum term for certain violent crimes upon a finding, based on past criminal behavior or the presence of at least one aggravating factor, that the
defendant is a danger to public safety. Judges may also impose the maximum term for any other felony if a defendant has more than four prior
felony convictions and the court finds that the present offense "was committed as a part of a pattern of criminal conduct from which a substantial
portion of the offender's income was derived. '"9 3 Like the amenability provisions adopted for sex offenders in the mid-1980's, "4 the 1989 provisions
suggested that the legislature continued to accept individualized rehabilitative and incapacitative sentencing, albeit under stricter limits than applied prior to the Guidelines.
Finally, the 1989 Omnibus Crime Bill contained several provisions
suggesting that the legislature no longer trusted the Commission to set
sufficiently severe presumptive sentences and that the legislature had decided to reclaim some of its power to set specific sentencing guidelines
and policy. The legislation amended the enabling act to specify that the
Commission's "primary goal" in setting sentencing guidelines should be
public safety-correctional resources and current practices would remain
as factors, but these factors would no longer be taken into "substantial
consideration." 5 In addition, the legislation directed the Commission to
increase penalties at severity levels IX and X by specified amounts and to
add a specific provision to the Guidelines' list of aggravating circumstances.9 6 Finally, the legislation gave judges authority in certain cases to
impose the statutory maximum prison term, without regard to ordinary
9 7
Guidelines rules governing departure and degree of departure.
E.

1990 and 1991 Legislation

The legislature's principal 1990 crime bill appeared to endorse further individualized assessments of dangerousness and treatability. Central to this bill was a set of provisions authorizing and minutely
structuring "Intensive Community Supervision" (ICS) under the control
of the state Commissioner of Corrections." Eligible offenders include: (1)
inmates on supervised release; (2) offenders committed to custody following revocation of a stayed prison term; and (3) certain offenders originally
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. art. 2, §§ 9-2, -3.
Id. art. 2, § 9-3.
For a discussion of these provisions, see supra text at notes 52-55.
1989 Minn. Laws 290, art. 2, § 8.
Id. art. 2, § 17; art. 3, § 25.
Id. art. 2, § 9; art. 4, § 10.
1990 Minn. Laws 568, art. 2, §§ 31-36.
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committed to prison for terms of twenty-seven months or less. These limitations suggest that the legislature was primarily interested in diverting
offenders from prison rather than tightening supervision of probationers.
Apparently, the legislature had begun to realize the serious repercussions
on the prison population of the major sentencing severity increases enacted in 1989.
The ICS provisions, however, also demonstrate the legislature's continued commitment to utilitarian, offender-based sentencing goals. The
eligibility of the third group defined above was subject to several additional limitations, including the requirement that the defendant's presence in the community not create a danger to public safety. 9 The
Commissioner of Corrections was directed to revoke the release of any
offender who failed to follow program rules, who committed a new offense, or who "present[ed] a risk to the public, based on the offender's
behavior, attitude, or abuse of alcohol or controlled substances." 100 In administering ICS programs, the Commissioner was further directed to (1)
punish the offender, (2) protect the public, (3) facilitate employment of
the offender during ICS and afterward, and (4) require restitution to victims where ordered by the court. 10 '
The ICS statute is significant, not only for its endorsement of utilitarian, offender-based punishment, but also for its refusal to accept preGuidelines notions of unfettered administrative discretion. After strictly
defining eligible offenders, the statute minutely specified the operating
guidelines of ICS programsl° -no more than fifteen offenders per probation officer; four defined phases of ICS, each with specified durations, degree of house arrest, and required face-to-face contacts and drug testing;
specified work requirements; and mandatory revocation of release under
certain conditions. A 1991 statute eliminated these restrictions for offenders on supervised release, thereby restoring discretion and control to the
0 3
Department of Corrections.
F.

1992 Legislation

The 1992 crime bills continued many of the trends described above
and were precipitated by a wave of high-profile violent crimes and media
reports similar to the ones that had sparked the 1989 Omnibus Crime
Bill. In the summer of 1991, two female college students were kidnapped,
raped, and murdered-the first by two local men in her hometown in
northern Minnesota and the second by a repeat sex offender just released
from prison. In the late fall, the state's principal newspaper published a
sensational series of articles entitled "Free to Rape," arguing that Minnesota's sex offender penalties were far too lenient.1 0 4 Finally, in December,
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. art. 2, § 33-3(3).
Id. art. 2, § 35-3(3).
Id. art. 2, § 35-1.
Id. art. 2, §§ 34-2, 35-3, 36.
1991 Minn. Laws 258, § 2 (amending MINN. STAT. § 244.12-1 to -3) (1982).
Free to Rape, MINNEAPOLIS STAR Tam., Nov. 9-11, 1991, at 7A.
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the Minnesota Supreme Court ruled that the statutory and Guidelines
rules imposing heavier penalties on crack cocaine offenders than on powdered cocaine offenders violated the state constitution. The rules were
invalidated largely because of their disparate impact on blacks, who constituted the vast majority of crack cocaine offenders."0 5
This latter decision provoked an immediate and severe legislative response. In January of 1992, without waiting for the Commission's statutorily mandated report on drug sentences due in February, 106 the legislature
enacted a revised drug law that raised powdered cocaine penalties to
equal those previously applicable only to crack cocaine. 10 7 In addition,
key members of the Senate took the unusual step of writing a letter to
the Commission, urging it to rank certain cocaine offenses such that those
offenses would receive presumptive executed prison sentences.10 8 While
the Commission chose not to follow this recommendation, its decision to
retain most of the previous rankings applicable to each degree of drug
crime resulted in major increases in penalties for powdered cocaine cases,
which the 1992 drug law had shifted to higher degrees.
A "general purpose" crime bill was enacted later in the spring of
1992. Although this bill sought primarily to expand treatment, education,
and social service programs, it also contained "get tough" provisions for
certain sex offenders, including mandatory doubling of Guidelines presumptive sentences, lengthier supervised release terms, increased statutory maximums, and mandatory life and thirty-year prison terms. 0 ' In
addition, the legislation increased correctional discretion through provisions that allowed officials to require prisoners to participate in sex offender programs, to discipline those who refused to participate, and to
remove unamenable prisoners from such programs. 110 Furthermore, the
bill eliminated discretion to grant early release to certain amenable sex
offenders, while permitting the Commissioner of Corrections to select
other offenders for early release to a new boot-camp or "challenge incarceration" program.' Finally, renewed interest in the goal of "truth in
sentencing" led to the inclusion of a provision reversing the procedure for
applying good time credits. Instead of pronouncing a longer prison term
that is later reduced by up to one-third, judges now pronounce a sentence
equal to two-thirds of the presumptive term which can then be lengthened for misconduct in prison. 1 '
105.
106.

State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886, 888 (Minn. 1991).

MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM'N, REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE ON CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE OFFENSES 1 (1992).

107. 1992 Minn. Laws 358.
108. Letter to Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission (Feb. 20, 1992) (on file
with author).
109. 1992 Minn. Laws 571, art. 1, §§ 11-12, 14-15, 22-25. See also id. art. 1, § 13 (mandating life without parole for certain rape-murderers).
110. Id. art. 1, §1; art. 2, § 6.
111. Id. art. 1, § 12; art. 11, §§ 5-8.
112. Id. art. 2, §§ 3-7. See also id. art. 2, § 8 (removing 40-year cap on consecutive
sentences) and § 12 (directing the Commission to adopt presumptive consecutive sentences
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Summary

The legislative, judicial, and Commission-initiated changes described
above demonstrate that the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines have
evolved substantially over time, giving greater emphasis to treatment and
incapacitation goals and broader scope to individualized assessments of
offender amenability and dangerousness. The Guidelines in their present
form thus place less emphasis on just deserts and uniformity goals. This
evolutionary process has made the application of the Guidelines somewhat more complex than it once was, a trend which may be inherent in
any regulatory scheme. Perhaps more troubling than the evolving complexity of the Guidelines has been the recent tendency of the legislature
to take a more active and highly punitive role in establishing sentencing
policy. The Commission still retains primary control over setting statewide sentencing policy. However, the Commission no longer enjoys the
relative monopoly and insulation from public scrutiny and political pressures that characterized its operation in the early 1980's.
IV.

ASSESSING THE PAST AND FUTURE SUCCESS OF THE GUIDELINES

To reach an accurate conclusion regarding the proper role of the legislature under a sentencing guidelines system, we must consider not only
the actions of the legislature, the Commission, and other criminal justice
system actors, but the actual success of the guidelines in achieving their
stated goals. This section summarizes the findings of studies evaluating
implementation of the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines and concludes
with some predictions of the developments that lie ahead.
A.

A Review of Past Achievements

A recent study evaluating the successes and failures of the Guidelines
through 1989113 identified the following major goals of the Minnesota
Sentencing Guidelines Commission: (1) greater uniformity in the use of
state prison sentences, with particular emphasis on preventing race, gender, and socio-economic disparities; (2) increased proportionality of
prison commitment rates and durations relative to the Commission's offense severity rankings, definition of criminal history, and other prescriptive choices; (3) the avoidance of prison overcrowding; (4) greater honesty
or "truth in sentencing," particularly with respect to the relationship between the sentence pronounced and the sentence actually served;11 4 (5)
simplicity in Guidelines definitions and application;' 1 5 (6) "parsimony" in
sentences (i.e., insuring that sentences are the least restrictive necessary
for crimes committed by inmates); id. art. 4, § 3 (mandatory minimum fines equal to 20% of
the statutory maximum fine).
113. See generally Frase, First Ten Years, supra note 2, at 3.
114. See, e.g., id. at 75; U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N GUIDELINES MANUAL (Nov. 1991), §
1A3; Frase, supra note 16, at 332.
115. See 1980 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 25, at 7 (construction of Criminal History score); PARENT, supra note 2, at 53 n.3, 58 n.8, 71.
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to achieve sentencing purpose);1 6 and (7) maintaining Commission control over state sentencing policy to ensure that such policy remains in11 7
formed, well-coordinated, and less subject to political pressures.
The Minnesota Guidelines have moved toward achieving most of
these goals. By abolishing parole and instituting "real-time" sentencing,
for example, Minnesota achieved greater "openness" and "honesty" of
punishment. The Guidelines also appear to have been modestly successful
in promoting greater "uniformity" in sentencing, despite major increases
in ethnic diversity among defendants during the 1980's.118 Under the
Guidelines, Minnesota has made very "parsimonious" use of prison
sentences and has avoided prison and jail overcrowding-notwithstanding
a seventy percent increase in the state's felony caseload from 1978 to
1989.11" The Guidelines have placed controls on judicial discretion, while
maintaining substantial flexibility to pursue a variety of sentencing purposes and to tailor sentences to individual cases.1 20 Despite the many
changes made since 1980, the Guidelines remain relatively simple to apply. Moreover, while the legislature has recaptured some of its originally
delegated authority, the Commission has maintained primary control over
121
statewide sentencing policy.
Indeed, it appears that the Minnesota Guidelines have substantially
achieved and maintained each of the goals listed above-with one exception. The Commission's efforts to effect certain prescriptive changes in
the use of imprisonment were relatively unsuccessful even during the
early implementation years of the Guidelines, and have become less and
less successful over time. 2 Trial judges have often departed from presumptive prison terms in the case of first offenders convicted of violent
crimes (especially child sex abuse and above-the-line weapons statute
cases).12 3 In addition, judges have made increasing use of "amenable-toprobation" departures based on utilitarian sentencing purposes that the
Commission has never formally recognized. 124 The policy of reducing imprisonment rates for recidivist property offenders was initially effective,
but the steady buildup of these offenders' criminal history scores eventually frustrated the policy by pushing offenders across the disposition
116.
117.

GUIDELINES,

supra note 1, § I.
Frase, Ten Years After, supra note 2, at 729-30.

118.

MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMI'N, SUMMARY OF 1990 SENTENCING PRACTICES

FOR CONVICTED FELONS 6 (Fig. 2) (1992) [hereinafter 1990 CohMMISSION SUMMARY]. Black defendants made up 20% of Minnesota's felony convictions in 1990-up from 11% in 1981.
The total nonwhite proportion grew from 19% in 1981 to 29% in 1990. Id.
119. In 1989, 7,974 defendants were sentenced. MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM'N,
SUMMARY OF 1989 SENTENCING PRACTICES FOR CONVICTED FELONS 29 (1990) [hereinafter 1989
COMMISSION SUMMARY]. This compares to an estimated 4,698 sentenced defendants in 1978.
See THREE YEAR EVALUATION, supra note 2, at 20. Preliminary data for 1991 indicates a
total of 9,161 sentenced felons, representing a 95% increase since 1978.
120. See, e.g., GUIDELINES, supra note 1, §§ II(C)-(D).
121. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 244.09-5 (West 1992).
122. See, e.g., Frase, First Ten Years, supra note 2, at 4.
123. See id. at 35.
124. See Frase, Ten Years After, supra note 2, at 742-47.
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line. 125 These findings contradict the claims of some commentators that
the Commission's prescriptive or norm-changing approach led to the
Guidelines' early success. 2 '
Viewed from the legislative perspective, however, one can argue that
the Guidelines have been entirely successful. The failures to achieve the
prescriptive changes described above have occurred in areas where legislative intent was ambiguous, if not wholly contrary to Commission policy.
The primary legislative purpose of the Guidelines was to reduce judicial
discretion-especially in parole decisions-without increasing either sentencing severity or prison populations. 127 The legislature also sought to
avoid changes in established punishment goals, except to de-emphasize
rehabilitative treatment in prison."18 As of 1992, it appears that the
Guidelines have continued to achieve these goals.
B. A Look to the Future
Looking to the future, however, the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines
may encounter difficulty in maintaining this success, particularly with respect to the goal of avoiding prison overcrowding. A recent study" 9 found
that, although Minnesota still had the nation's second-lowest per-resident
imprisonment rate in 1992, its prison population was rising rapidly and
was threatening to exceed capacity. Prison population increases were
greatest after 1988 and appeared to be the result of at least three factors:
(1) continuing increases in the number of felony convictions;"10 (2) the
initial impact of the substantial durational increases adopted in 1989; and
(3) increases in the rates of probation and parole revocation. 1 The most
recent' Minnesota projections estimate a prison population of over 4,700
inmates by the end of 1996, representing a dramatic increase over the
figures of earlier years."'3 Likewise, jail populations continue to grow, with
the average daily jail population reaching a record 3,950 in 1991.133 Nev125. See Frase, First Ten Years, supra note 2, at 38.
126. See, e.g., PARENT, supra note 2, at 39 (asserting that just deserts perspective lent
greater coherence of purpose to the drafting and implementation of the Guidelines). Cf. VON
HIRSCH ET AL., supra note 18, at 63 (expressing approval of the Minnesota Commission's

decision to develop its own policy for sentencing).
127. These purposes are reflected in the "Statement of Purpose and Principles" set
out in the Guidelines. See GUIDELINES, supra note 1, § I.
128. Id. However, the legislature has recently relaxed its opposition to coerced inprison treatment, at least in the case of sex offenders. See supra text accompanying note
110.
129. See Richard S. Frase, Prison Population Growing Under Minnesota Guidelines,
4 OVERCROWDED Tms 1, 10-12 (1993).
130. For a discussion of increased felony convictions, see supra note 119 and accompanying text.
131. See MINN. DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS, ADULT COURT COMMITMENTS 1 (1993); MINN.
DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS, ADULTS RETURNED VITHOUT NEW SENTENCES 1

(1993); Letter from

Gene Larramore (Jan. 7, 1993) (on file with author).
132. MINN. DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS, BACKGROUNDER 1 (Fig. 1) (Jan. 29, 1993).
133. MINN. DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS, JAIL POPULATION ISSUES 1 (1993); Interview with
Dennis Falenschek, Detention Program Manager, Minn. Dept. of Corrections) (interview on
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ertheless, most Minnesota jails and prisons
have, thus far, managed to
34
avoid serious overcrowding problems.
While other future developments are more difficult to predict, it
seems likely that Guidelines departure rates will continue to climb. For
example, the mitigated dispositional departure rate (computed as a percentage of defendants eligible for such a departure) was 33.7% in
1990-up from 28.3% in 1989 and 20.4% in 1981.135 Such increased
downward departure rates are not surprising, given the sharp increases in
durations enacted in 1989, combined with the fact that the Guidelines
cells with the highest percentage durational increases in 1989-severity
levels VII and VIII, at zero criminal history-are also the cells that traditionally have experienced the highest rates of downward departures
(about 50 percent). 136 Just as judges and prosecutors have typically used
their discretion to evade or dilute severe mandatory minimum prison
penalties,1 37 one can expect these officials to use their charging, plea bargaining, and departure powers to shelter certain defendants for whom
lengthy prison terms would seem too harsh.
Equally troubling future developments include the possibility that
the legislature will continue its punitive activism in the area of sentencing
policy in reaction to high-profile violent crimes, sensational journalism,
and electoral posturing. The crime bills enacted from 1989 through 1992
reveal the following ominous trends: (1) "creeping indeterminism"-increasing numbers of statutes authorizing courts or prison officials to make
individualized assessments of treatability and dangerousness; (2) "creeping determinism"-increasing numbers of laws imposing mandatory minimum prison sentences; (3) "legislative micro-management" of Guidelines
policy-more ad hoc tinkering with sentencing laws, including specific directives to the Commission to make changes in ranking, duration, and
departure rules; and (4) "credit-card-sentencing policy"-an increasing
willingness to enact severe penalties with little or no consideration given
to whether the state has, or will ever have, the resources to meet the resulting demand.138
file with author). This number is up from 2,758 in 1986 and 2,167 in 1981. Average daily jail
populations fell in 1992, to 3,610. Id.
134. See Frase, First Ten Years, supra note 2, at 44.
135. Minn. Sentencing Guidelines Comm'n Monitoring Data (analyzed by the author,
using SPSS PC+ software). Preliminary data for 1991 show a further increase to 34.4%.
These rates would be even higher if they included de facto downward dispositional departures achieved through charging and plea bargaining leniency. See Frase, First Ten Years,
supra note 2, at 19-22, 16-18 (explaining the importance of basing dispositional departure
rates on eligible cases, not on total cases).
136. See, e.g., 1989 COMMISSION SuMMARY, supra note 119, at 37 (1989 prison-commitment, no-departure rates in these cells were only 51.0 and 53.3 percent, respectively).
137. See 1 A. BLUMSTEIN ET AL., RESEARCH ON SENTENCING: THE SEARCH FOR REFORM

188-89 (1983).
138.

See generally Richard S. Frase, The Uncertain Future of Sentencing Guidelines

(1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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V.

LESSONS FOR LEGISLATORS IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS

As legislators in other jurisdictions consider implementing a sentencing guidelines system, they should carefully consider the lessons of Minnesota's long experience with guidelines. That experience suggests the
following conclusions about the processes of drafting an enabling statute
and defining the legislature's post-implementation role.
A.

Drafting the Guidelines Enabling Statute'39
1.

Use of a sentencing commission

The creation of an independent commission to draft sentencing
guidelines has been recognized as having the advantage of allowing sentencing policy to be more expertly crafted, while insulating the process
from the distortion of political pressures.'" The first of these rationales-delegation-is an argument supporting the creation of specialized
administrative agencies in general. The second argument recognizes a
problem that is particularly acute in the criminal law context. Any attempt to legislate more precise sentences must overcome the "politics of
crime control"-the tendency for elected officials, not wanting to appear
"soft" on crime, to demand unrealistically severe penalties. This political
reality becomes especially significant in any attempt to abolish parole and
move to a system in which judges set "real time" sentences. Such a move
reveals the relatively short terms typically served in prison for common
offenses. Hence, the need arises to have those terms set by an independent, appointed commission insulated from direct electoral pressures.
As Minnesota's experience demonstrates, the creation of an independent commission is a workable and highly desirable feature of sentencing
reform.' However, legislators. and reformers must not place absolute
faith in the expertise and insulation rationales. Given the fundamental
value choices inherent in sentencing policy and the need to achieve internal consensus and satisfy a variety of external constituencies, the sentencing reform process is essentially and inevitably a "political" task.
Although the use of a sentencing commission can buffer the process somewhat from short-term 42 political pressures, as Minnesota's experience
139. For a discussion of these issues as of the mid-1980's, see VON HIRSCH ET AL., supra
note 18, at 62-83. See also Michael Tonry, The Politics and Processes of Sentencing Commissions, 37 CRIME & DELINQ. 307, 317-27 (1991).
140. See VON HIRSCH ET AL., supra note 18, at 7.
141. For a discussion of Minnesota's experience, see PARENT, supra note 2, at 208.
142. In the long run, of course, if the public really wants more punitive sentences, that
is what the public will get. However, political pressures for greater severity often reflect
transitory reactions to notorious crimes and/or media reports. In Minnesota, for example, in
spite of the recent trend toward more punitive legislation, public opinion surveys reveal a
widespread preference for education, job training, community programs and restitution, as
opposed to more punishment. KAY PRANIS & MARK UMBREIT, PUBLIC OPINION RESEARCH
CHALLENGES PERCEPTION

OF WIDESPREAD

(Minn. Citizens Council 1992).

PUBLIC DEMAND
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shows, those pressures may still be very intense. 143 Thus, commission
members must be politically astute, as well as capable, experienced, and
committed to reform. At the very least, some commission members must
have significant political experience and connections-as did the first
chair of the Minnesota Commission 4 4 -for the commission to be effective
initially and over the long term.
How can legislators ensure that these qualifications are met? To
maintain the commission's independence, the legislature must not play a
direct role in filling commission vacancies; however, legislators should
give careful consideration to the choice of other appointing officials, appointment qualifications, and ex officio membership. 145 An explicit requirement of non-partisanship or bipartisan balance may also be
desirable in some states.
2. Initial budget and time-frame
Just as important as who the commissioners are is how much money
and time they are allotted to spend in drafting the initial guidelines. The
Minnesota Commission, despite its substantial initial budget and broad
research mandate, was given insufficient funding to address all important
issues carefully.4 4 As might be expected, budget problems only grew
worse with time. 1 47 Unless the sentencing commission has adequate research and staff resources, it cannot provide either the necessary expertise or independence of control over sentencing policy that are central to
its role.
The initial time frame for drafting guidelines is equally important.
Even with sufficient monetary resources, a limit exists as to how quickly a
commission can absorb research and staff proposals, discuss alternatives,
and refine proposed policies. Inadequate time was a major reason for the
Minnesota Commission's initial failure to adopt guidelines for non-imprisonment sanctions. 48 When the Commission later returned to the issue, field opposition had become prohibitive. 4 As discussed below, it is
not entirely clear whether guidelines for non-imprisonment sanctions are
143. For a discussion of the political pressures in Minnesota, see PARENT, supra note
2, at 135-53.
144. See id. at 31.
145. In Minnesota, the Governor appoints most of the commissioners and the Chief
Justice appoints the rest. The State Public Defender or County Attorney's Association must
nominate the prosecutor and defense attorney members. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 244.09-2
(West 1992).
146. PARENT, supra note 2, at 209.
147. Id. at 217.
148. Id. at 209-10.
149. Id. at 210. In 1988, the Minnesota Legislature ordered the Commission to study
whether it should develop non-imprisonment guidelines. In 1989, the Commission recommended against such guidelines. MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM'N, REPORT TO THE
LEGISLATURE ON THREE SPECIAL ISSUES 20 (1989). Although several pilot projects were underway, most criminal justice officials were strongly opposed to statewide guidelines. Id. at
33.
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a good idea. If the legislature believes that non-imprisonment guidelines
are desirable, it must provide sufficient time and money at the outset for
their drafting. The task does not become easier, and may become more
difficult, with the passage of time.
3. Specific directives as to sentencing goals or outcomes
Although some guidelines enabling statutes have specifically mandated the purposes of punishment and the commission's approach to certain issues, 150 the Minnesota statute as originally drafted merely directed
the Commission to take current sentencing and release practices into
"substantial consideration." The Commission interpreted this language as
permitting substantial changes in previous sentencing norms and responded by enacting "prescriptive" rather than "descriptive" guidelines.
Minnesota's experience, however, suggests that such prescriptive changes
are unlikely to succeed, especially in the long run. Highly prescriptive
guidelines may make sentencing appear more rational, but such guidelines will not win the vital support of judges, attorneys, and correctional
officials. These officials will likely use their remaining, unregulated discretionary powers in charging, plea bargaining, and setting and revoking probation and supervised release conditions to circumvent the unpopular
guidelines requirements. Such covert evasion invites greater sentence disparity and undermines the goal of "truth in sentencing," because critical
decisions about the nature and severity of the sentence are not made
openly and honestly. As Minnesota's experience demonstrates, presumptive sentencing guidelines can reinforce existing norms and encourage
criminal justice system actors to follow those guidelines more consistently. Presumptive sentencing guidelines can even effect modest changes
in existing norms. However, any guidelines-whether voluntary, presumptive, or mandatory-are unlikely to permanently alter state and local traditions and the strongly-held beliefs of the officials who control
sentencing and release decisions.' 5' No system has yet to succeed in
wringing all discretion, and hence, all potential for evasion, out of the
charging, plea bargaining, and sentencing processes.
Future guidelines enabling statutes should provide more detailed direction to the commission than did the Minnesota statute. These statutes
should not simply direct the commission to take current sentencing and
release practices into "substantial consideration," but should further limit
any prescriptive changes in existing punishment goals or sentencing of
particular offenses or offenders to those needed to achieve other enumerated guidelines goals (for example, respecting existing resource limits). In
addition, these statutes should direct the commission to eliminate uncon150. See VON HIRSCH ET AL., supra note 18, at 67-69 (discussing provisions of law creating the U.S. Sentencing Commission).
151. Cf. Michael Tonry, Structuring Sentencing, 10 CRIME & JUST. 267, 330 (1988)
(discussing research on the persistence of pre-existing norms and traditions, despite reform
efforts).
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stitutional or other clearly inappropriate policies.' 52 Future legislative reformers must recognize that sentencing-and therefore guidelines
drafting and implementation-demands compromise to achieve several
important, but mutually inconsistent goals. For instance, general deterrence and uniformity require limited discretion, while rehabilitation and
incapacitation require considerable individualization; general deterrence
and just deserts focus on the offense, while most other punishment goals
focus on the offender; and crime-control-oriented goals, especially deterrence and incapacitation, conflict with state budget and prison capacity
limitations. The Minnesota Guidelines strike a workable balance among
these competing goals, a balance that other jurisdictions should strive to
replicate.
Legislators must exercise particular caution in enacting or expanding
mandatory minimum penalties, or in directing the new commission to
substantially increase sentencing severity for certain offenders. Until recently, Minnesota had very few mandatory minimum penalties. Those in
place, especially those applicable to use or possession of a weapon in a
case which would not otherwise carry a presumptive prison sentence, have
often not been enforced. 5" Overall, Minnesota's experience suggests that
presumptive sentence maximums are much easier to enforce than pre5
sumptive or mandatory minimums.5'
This is due, in part, to the desire to
mitigate presumptive or statutory penalties deemed unreasonably harsh.
Further, practically all systems of investigation, adjudication, and sentencing depend to some extent on the cooperation of defendants. Such
cooperation must be purchased with leniency. Before and at trial, defendants must be given inducements to confess, plead guilty, testify against
others, and so on. At sentencing, the court must initially "under-punish";
that is, give defendants less than their full deserts to leave room for subsequent tightening of sanctions (e.g., by revocation of probation or good
time) if the defendant proves uncooperative. Since most defendants do
cooperate, at least to some extent, very few receive the full authorized
presumptive or "mandatory" punishment. 55 Because a few do receive full
punishment, however, a principal effect of increased sentencing severity is
increased sentencing disparity.
Although mandatory or even presumptive minimum terms are difficult to enforce, it may be possible to achieve major prescriptive change in
the opposite direction-toward reduced severity, in particular, reduced
reliance on lengthy custodial sentences. As suggested above, Minnesota's
experience suggests that presumptive maximum sentences are more en152. Cf. VON HIRSCH ET AL., supra note 18, at 62-69 (enabling acts should not specify a
sentencing rationale or mandate specific sentences, but the commission should be directed
to adopt a prescriptive approach and develop its own theory of punishment).
153. See, e.g., Frase, First Ten Years, supra note 2, at 25 (80% departure rate in
1987).
154. Id. at 31-35.
155. Thus, in practice, states can inevitably achieve only the "limiting" retributivist
punishment theory implicit in the Minnesota Guidelines. For an explanation of this theory,
see supra text accompanying notes 41-44.
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forceable, largely because defendants can be counted on to appeal upward
departures from the presumptive term. In states where prisons or jails are
overcrowded, or where custody sentences are being used very heavily (relative to the crime rate and to custody sentence rates in other states),
legislators should consider explicitly authorizing or even directing the
sentencing commission to study the need for current custody sentence
rates and recommend appropriate reductions. Of course, any such overt
"roll-back" in severity levels is difficult for elected legislators to propose
and approve, but there are ways'to achieve the same result indirectly (for
example, freezing jail and prison capacity while sentenced caseloads rise
or allowing trial courts to substitute equally punitive intermediate
sanctions).
4.

The prison capacity constraint

Overcrowded prisons are unsafe, inhumane, and criminogenic, and
must be avoided at all costs. Presumptive sentences permit "front-end"
control over the prison population by limiting commitment rates and
durations and by making prison sentences more predictable than under a
traditional indeterminate sentencing scheme. Under a sentencing guidelines system, a prison capacity constraint becomes essential because parole no longer operates as a "safety valve" to relieve prison overcrowding
and to counter political pressures that escalate penalties unreasonably.
Using a commission to set presumptive sentences maximizes the potential
for avoiding prison overcrowding. Such a commission can develop sophisticated measures to accurately predict prison populations and can use
these measures to tailor its sentencing rules to stay within expected
capacity.
As Minnesota's experience demonstrates, an assumption of limited
prison capacity is an essential component of guidelines development, one
that should be explicitly provided for in the enabling legislation. Indeed,
future legislation should go beyond the Minnesota statute, which only required that capacity be taken into "substantial consideration," and mandate that projected prison population not exceed 95% of prison capacity.
However, as Minnesota's experience in recent years also illustrates, a limited-capacity model during guidelines development and implementation
does not necessarily require, or guarantee, "zero growth" in prison population over the long term. The Minnesota Commission never formally
adopted a zero-growth policy, but its decided emphasis on staying within
existing capacity, and its failure to take an active role in defining future
capacity, may have suggested that the Commission advocated zero
growth. Such a posture is risky in that it weakens political support and
invites public backlash and "scapegoating" of the commission. The result
may be a prison population that not only increases, but does so at a rate
faster than the crime rate. An exclusive focus on existing prison capacity
also mandates continued revision of the guidelines rules, undercutting
their overall balance and coherence. Furthermore, such a focus encourages overcrowding in local jails, many of which are already seriously defi-
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cient in terms of plant, security, staffing, and programs.152
Future sentencing commissions should play a more active role in defining prison capacity, and the enabling statute should encourage such a
role. The statute should direct the commission to consider the impact of
rising crime rates and projected criminal caseloads, as well as current and
proposed sentencing rules, in recommending either increases in prison capacity or specific non-prison, "intermediate" sanctions.15 Although the
commission cannot appropriate funds to pay for such expanded prison
capacity or alternative sanctions, it can recommend specific prison and
alternative sanction expansions to the legislature, accompanied by any
prison population reducing guidelines amendments (for example, reduced
durations) needed to stay within currently funded capacity. Such amendments would be rescinded as soon as the needed additional capacity was
funded.
5. Guidelines for non-prison sentences
The Minnesota Commission's failure to formulate guidelines for probation and other non-imprisonment sanctions is considered by many to
be a major item of "unfinished business." Several commentators15 8 have
maintained that such guidelines are feasible and essential, and that future enabling statutes should require their development at the outset or
within a prescribed number of years.
Significant difficulties exist, however, in drafting meaningful non-imprisonment guidelines and in ensuring their enforcement. First, non-imprisonment guidelines require a substantial and expensive database
describing the current use of intermediate sanctions. Such data did not
exist in Minnesota in 1980; nor does it exist in Minnesota or in most
states today.1 59 Second, discretion in the area of non-imprisonment guidelines is closely related to the purposes of punishment. If, as Minnesota
has done, other states continue to pursue rehabilitative sentencing goals
for less serious offenders, judges and attorneys will require substantial
flexibility in setting the conditions of probation, in revoking probation,
156. See generally U.S. DEPT. OF JUST., BULLETIN: CENSUS OF LOCAL JAILS, 1988, at 1
(1990). Between 1978 and 1990, the proportion of Minnesota felons sentenced to local jails
increased from 35% to 61%. 1990 COMMISSION SUMMARY, supra note 118, at 54. As a result
of this heavy use of jail sentences, Minnesota's overall custody-sentence rate, prison plus
jail, is actually higher than the national average, although its prison rate is much lower. In
1986, 75% of Minnesota felony sentences involved either jail (55%) or prison (20%) commitments.

MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM'N,

1988

DATA SUMMARY

1, 6 (1990). In the

same year, the estimated U.S. felony incarceration rate was only 67%-jail (21%) and
prison (46%). U.S. DEPT. OF JUST., BULLETIN: FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 1986, at 2
(Table 2) (1989).
157.

See generally NORVAL

MORRIS & MICHAEL TONRY, BETWEEN PRISON AND PROBA-

(1990).
158. PARENT, supra note 2, at 209, 217; VON HIRSCH ET AL., supra note 18, at 64.
159. See PARENT, supra note 2, at 96-97. However, some recent data on conditions of
stayed sentences in 37 counties in 1987 has been collected. See generally MINN. SENTENCING
TION: INTERMEDIATE PUNISHMENTS IN A RATIONAL SENTENCING SYSTEM

GUIDELINES COMM'N, REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE ON INTERMEDIATE SANCTIONS 1

(1991).
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and in accommodating local variations in crime problems, values, and resources. Third, the Minnesota Commission has recognized that simplicity
of application is a separate and important goal.160 At some point, the cost
of developing and enforcing further guidelines refinements outweighs the
benefits in reduced disparity. Finally, non-imprisonment guidelines-particularly at the lower limits of sanction severity-are difficult to
enforce. As noted earlier, the experience under the Minnesota Guidelines
illustrates that upper limits of sanction severity are much more likely to
be strictly enforced than lower limits 6' because most cases of leniency are
agreed to by the prosecutor and are not appealed. 62
However, it may be desirable and feasible to develop non-imprisonment guidelines for at least one category of cases-defendants who would
otherwise receive a jail or short prison term. Particularly if a state's prisons or jails are overcrowded or appear to be overused, sentencing judges
need to be given the maximum encouragement to substitute non-custodial sentences. In such states, the legislature 9hould direct the sentencing
commission to develop "equivalency" scales of equally punitive and effective intermediate sanctions (for example, one day in jail may be replaced
by X days of home detention, or Y day-fines, or Z days of community
service). 1 3 Indeed, even in states without serious problems of prison overcrowding or overuse, the sentencing commission should probably still be
directed to develop such equivalency scales at some point to promote the
use of cheaper but equally effective forms of "punishment." Other nations
have learned how to impose just and effective punishment by means far
less costly than prison; it is time we joined them.
6. Guidelines for charging and plea bargaining
A second significant area of unfinished business in Minnesota is the
absence of guidelines for charging and plea bargaining. Some commentators have suggested that future enabling legislation specifically require
adoption of such guidelines. 6 5 However, as with guidelines for non-imprisonment sanctions, serious difficulties exist in drafting and enforcing
charging and plea bargaining guidelines. These difficulties include: (1) the
lack of suitable databases concerning existing practices, especially regarding the evidentiary strength of unfiled or dismissed charges; (2) the need
for substantial flexibility in choosing between prison and probation to
160. See PARENT, supra note 2, at 71.
161. See Frase, First Ten Years, supra note 2, at 32-34.
162. Another party (e.g., the victim or the Commission) could be granted standing to
appeal. See Michael Tonry & John C. Coffee, Jr., Enforcing Sentencing Guidelines: Plea
Bargainingand Review Mechanisms, in VON HIRSCH ET AL., supra note 18, at 171-72. However, such appeals might substantially encumber the appellate courts.
163. MORRIS & TONRY, supra note 157, at 37-108.
164. Richard S. Frase, Comparative Criminal Justice as a Guide to American Law
Reform: How Do the French Do It, How Can We Find Out, and Why Should We Care?, 78
CAL. L. REv. 539, 648-58 (1990) (French custody-sentence rate per offense much less severe
than American rate).
165. See, e.g., PARENT, supra note 2, at 209, 217.
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achieve remaining rehabilitative and incapacitative sentencing goals; (3)
the competing goal of simplicity; and above all, (4) the lack of suitable
enforcement mechanisms. Since charging or plea bargaining leniency is,
by definition, agreed to by the prosecutor, undue leniency is not likely to
be appealed by either party. Even if appealed, courts are ill-equipped to
second-guess refusals to charge and to assess the proveability of unfiled or
dismissed charges. The original Minnesota enabling statute was silent on
this issue, arguably depriving the Commission of authority to implement
any charging or plea bargaining guidelines. As of late 1992, no legislative
or Commission-initiated proposal subjecting any aspect of charging or
plea bargaining to guidelines or other limitations had been offered.
Future legislative drafteis must be realistic in authorizing or mandating detailed state-wide charging or plea bargaining guidelines. One approach may be to create a system that leaves initial charging discretion to
the prosecutor, but imposes some sort of charging "cut-off" point, after
which courts would closely scrutinize further charge revisions.166 Combining this approach with somewhat broader cell ranges and departure standards may encourage sentence-bargaining rather than charge-bargaining,
thus avoiding the distortion of conviction records and bringing policy issues within the purview of appellate courts and the commission. In any
case, legislatures must be sure to mandate and fund research that provides reliable data on the "real" (i.e., highest provable) offense, data that
can be used to assess the extent of actual change in sentencing practices
and the need for charging and plea bargaining limits. This becomes a critical issue in a conviction-offense system and represents a major void in
167
Minnesota's otherwise extensive sentencing database.
7. Choice between "conviction" versus "real-offense" sentencing
One way to deal with charging variations is to enact guidelines that
base the sentence on the "real" offense, as established at the sentencing
hearing, rather than on the formal "conviction" offense. 168 With few exceptions, Minnesota has adopted a conviction-offense system, and that
system appears to have worked well in practice.'6"
8.

Binding effect of the guidelines and appellate review

Another important issue is whether the enabling statute should specify the new guidelines as mandatory, presumptively binding, or merely
166. For a discussion of one such proposal aimed at controlling problems of "vertical"
charging discretion, see Frase, supra note 164, at 633-34. See also id. at 618-21, 635-36 (discussing how stricter rules barring sentence enhancements for multiple offenses can help to
limit problems of disparity in "horizontal" charging).
167. See Frase, Ten Years After, supra note 2, at 738, 752; Frase, First Ten Years,
supra note 2, at 19-22, 48.
168. I tend to agree with those authors who have argued against real-offense sentencing. See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer, Due Process of Sentencing, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 733, 75772 (1980); Tonry & Coffee, supra note 162, at 152-61.
169. See Miethe, supra note 2, at 158.
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advisory. As noted earlier, "mandatory" penalties are rarely enforced as
such in practice; at the other extreme, studies of purely advisory guidelines suggest that they achieve very little.17 0 Minnesota's presumptive system appears to strike the proper balance between providing legislative,
judicial, and Commission guidance and recognizing the need for flexibility
to tailor the sentence to the offense and to the offender.
Future legislation should also provide a specific standard for departure and appellate review. 17 ' The standard developed by the Minnesota
Commission-substantial and compelling circumstances-has apparently
achieved a workable balance, generating a steady, though not overwhelming, volume of appeals and appellate precedent. In states with an intermediate court of appeals, or with multiple panels of the supreme court, it
may be desirable to specify that some or all appeals dealing with the
guidelines be heard by a single appellate panel. Most of the essential
caselaw discussing guidelines in Minnesota was decided by the singlepanel supreme court. As this experience demonstrates, review by one
specified body allows for the rapid development of a coherent and consistent body of guidelines precedent.
9.

Review of initial guidelines and later amendments

A final question concerns whether the guidelines formulated by the
commission should require affirmative legislative approval or whether
those guidelines, absent legislative action, should take automatic effect at
some point after submission. The Minnesota Legislature's veto has never
been exercised, either as to the initial Guidelines or proposed amendments.172 This suggests that a veto 'provision serves to encourage the legislature to abstain from tinkering with Commission proposals. As noted
earlier, the concept of an independent, expert sentencing commission requires a substantial degree of legislative deference and abstention. Thus,
the veto approach appears preferable to a requirement of affirmative approval, which might encourage the legislature to become too actively involved in guidelines drafting. 7 3 Enabling acts should, therefore, specify a
veto procedure for both initial and subsequent commission proposals.
B.

Defining the Legislature's Post-implementationRole
1. Budgeting

The Minnesota Commission's initial budgetary authorization quickly
became inadequate, producing only a minimum set of preliminary Guidelines. As of 1992, the Commission had limited resources to manage its
170. See 1 A. BLUMSTEIN ET AL., supra note 137, at 30.
171. VON HiRSCH ET AL., supra note 18, at 73.
172. See PARENT, supra note 2, at 139 (in Minnesota, only one floor vote was taken
and no committee hearings were held to consider the Commission's proposed initial
Guidelines).
173. VON HIRSCH ET AL., supra note 18, at 72-73.
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ongoing monitoring system 1 4 and could neither carry out in-depth studies, nor respond quickly to legislative requests for specific data. In its
early operation, the Commission had been able to draw on its expertise
and unique data capabilities to inform the legislature and media about
current sentencing practices and the future impact of proposed
changes.175 More recently, the Commission has had neither the staff nor
the resources necessary to perform those important functions.
Adequate budgeting is vital to a sentencing commission in providing
comprehensive, well-informed development of sentencing policy and in
ensuring that its policies are properly implemented. Sentencing policies
are thereby insulated from the pressures and distortions of electoral politics. The budget of future commissions must, therefore, be sufficient to
permit thorough routine monitoring of all sentences, as well as regular indepth studies at the commission's initiative and in response to legislative
requests. In addition, the commission must possess a state-of-the-art, online computerized information system, coupled with a substantial social
science and clerical staff. Such an adequately-funded information, research, and planning body is essential, since state and local correctional
expenses are a significant item in most state budgets. Budget cuts here
will only lead to ill-informed policymaking that will prove more expensive
in the long run.
2.

The legislative role in setting specific sentencing policy

An ongoing issue is how future legislative drafters should define their
post-implementation role in the setting of sentencing policy for specific
offenses. Although the form and severity of authorized as well as presumptive penalties are ultimately a legislative responsibility that cannot
be wholly delegated to an administrative agency, legislators must defer to
the extent possible to commission recommendations and resist the temptation to escalate penalties in response to short-term political pressures
and sensational journalism. Legislators must be particularly wary of the
previously noted trends now apparent in Minnesota: (1) "creeping determinism"-increasing numbers of mandatory minimum penalties; (2)
"creeping indeterminism"-increasing numbers of provisions authorizing
individualized assessments of treatability and dangerousness; (3) "legislative micro-management" of Guidelines policies-increasing enactment of
specific directives to the Commission; and (4) "credit-card-sentencing
policy"-increasing numbers of penalties imposed without regard to the
availability of funds to support those penalties.
Minnesota's return to a "credit-card-sentencing policy" is ironic,
given the nation's recent painful emergence from the excesses of the debtridden 1980's. However, the temptation to live beyond the state's current
means is particularly strong, in the area of sentencing, which is subject to
174. This lack of resources was evidenced by a nine-month backlog in processing sentencing data received from the Minnesota Supreme Court.
175. See PARENT, supra note 2, at 144.
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a seemingly universal bias in favor of enhanced penalties. To deal with
this inherent bias, every crime bill should, by law, require a fiscal impact
statement which includes: (1) an assessment of the short-term and longterm cost of the bill; and (2) the source of the funding (i.e., whether that
cost will be funded through higher taxes or by the loss of other important
public services). If properly funded, the commission and its data can help
legislators document costs and tradeoffs for their constituents.
A second way to counteract the inherent bias of crime-control politics
is to maintain a bipartisan approach to criminal justice. Just as politicians traditionally close ranks when a foreign war breaks out, the domestic "war on crime" or "war on drugs" must maintain a coolness of mind
and an awareness of joint purpose.
Finally, legislators must never lose sight of the initial rationale for
creating an independent sentencing commission. Legislators must look for
ways to support and further the commission's independence and expertise
in order to promote sound policy and to protect themselves and the
state's budget from political pressures. This, in turn, will necessitate that
the commission's budget and membership be comparable to its weighty
responsibilities. To preserve commission independence, the legislature
must not play a direct role in filling commission vacancies. However, legislative leaders must indirectly encourage appointment of individuals
with stature, experience, and devotion to the goals of the guidelines. In
defining, appointing, and dealing with commission members, a sound rule
of thumb would be to treat the commission as a "quasi-judicial" body
with the prestige, independence, and power of the state's highest appellate court. This standard is admittedly high; yet, it reflects the significance and difficulty of the commission's task.
CONCLUSION

As the Minnesota experience demonstrates, a system of presumptive
sentences drafted by an independent commission can work to narrow discretion, operate within prison capacity, and effect modest changes in the
type of offenders sent to prison. However, as this experience also shows,
the ultimate scope of reform under a sentencing guidelines system is necessarily limited. Criminal justice reform operates in a systemic context, a
complex web of interrelated rules and unregulated discretion, where
changes in one facet of the system are often cancelled by compensating
changes elsewhere in the system. Minnesota has yet to achieve many of
the prescriptive changes in sentencing theory and policy sought by the
Commission. Nevertheless, the Minnesota Guidelines have achieved a
unique and impressive balance among the important, and inherently competing, goals and limitations of punishment.
In following Minnesota's lead, sentencing reformers in other states
must temper their idealism with realism, setting their sights on attainable
and affordable goals. Even a modest change in existing practices requires
a substantial commitment to research and implementation which, in turn,
requires a substantial financial commitment to the work of the sentencing
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commission initially and over time. Legislators must give careful attention, not only to the drafting of the guidelines enabling statute, but to
their post-implementation relationship with the commission. Moreover,
legislators must never lose sight of the value of an independent, expert
commission, and must seek whenever possible to fully support its research and policy-making functions. Above all, a successful sentencing
guidelines reform effort demands a commission with the seriousness of
purpose in its leadership, the dedication and technical competence in its
staff, and the clear vision of broadly based policy reform that have characterized the operation of the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines
Commission.

